日米法学会第５２回総会
日時：２０１５年9月２６日（土）午後１時〜５時３０分
　　　２０１５年９月２７日（日）午前１０時３０分〜午後５時３０分
場所：キャンパスプラザ京都（京都駅から徒歩５分）

プログラム
９月２６日（土）　判例研究会

午後1時ー1時50分「RFRAの適用事例」
Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
小林祐紀（朝日大学講師）
非公開企業の所有者の宗教的信条に反する避妊方法を従業員に提供する健康保険に含めるよう要求する連邦法は企業の信教の自由を侵害するとされた事例

午後1時55分ー2時45分「国際カルテル事件」
Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015)
越知保見（明治大学教授、東京六本木法律特許事務所）
米国では、反トラスト法の国際的適用(域外適用)に関し、米国にカルテルの効果が及ぶ限り、反トラスト法が適用されるといういわゆる効果理論・効果主義がとられてきた。ただし、最近では、証券取引法の域外適用に関するモリソン判決が効果主義がとられるためには、実定法の根拠が必要であるとの判断が行われたこともあり、近年では、効果主義を成文化した外国通商反トラスト改善法（Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act(以下、「FTAIA」という)の解釈問題として争われるようになっており、複雑な判例法が展開している。本件と本件に関する刑事事件の第９高裁決定は、この議論に決定的影響を与える可能性があるものとして注目されている。

午後2時50分ー3時40分「転送サービスと著作権」
American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014)
孫　友容　（北海道大学大学院）
ユーザー毎に割り当てられるアンテナに基づき、インターネットを経由するテレビ番組の「1対1」的転送サービスについて、著作権法上の「公の実演権」に対する直接侵害の該当性が認められた事例

午後3時45分ー4時35分「日本の判決の執行」
Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984 (2013)
高杉 直（同志社大学教授）
日本の裁判所が下した損害賠償判決について、合衆国内の裁判所による承認執行が「州の行為（state action）」に該当しないから合衆国憲法に違反せず、また、カリフォルニア州と合衆国のいずれの公序にも反しないとして、同州の統一外国金銭判決承認法の下で承認執行を認めた事例

午後4時40分ー5時30分「休会任命条項の適用事例」
National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S.__, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014)
御幸聖樹（横浜国立大学准教授）
合衆国憲法第2編2節3項（休会任命条項）につき、合衆国最高裁判所が初めて解釈を行った事例

９月２７日（日）シンポジウム
「ドッド＝フランク法の現在」
Charles W. Mooney, Jr. (University of Pennsylvania Law School)
Patricia A. McCoy (Boston College Law School)
松尾直彦（西村あさひ法律事務所、東京大学客員教授）
松元暢子（学習院大学准教授）
萬澤陽子（専修大学講師）
森下哲朗（上智大学教授）
小出篤（学習院大学教授・コーディネーター）

＜シンポジウムの趣旨＞
いわゆるサブプライムローン問題を一つの契機として顕在化した米国発の金融システム不安は、2008年のリーマン・ショックを経て、100年に1度とも言われる世界的な金融危機を引き起こすに至った。2010年7月21日に成立したドッド＝フランク法（ドッド＝フランク・ウォールストリート改革および消費者保護法；Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act）は、このような危機への反省から、「金融システムにおける説明責任と透明性を改善することにより合衆国の金融の安定を促進し、「大きすぎてつぶせない(too big to fail)」を終わらせ、救済措置の終了によってアメリカの納税者を保護し、濫用的な金融サービスの慣行から消費者を保護することその他の目的」（ドッド＝フランク法前文）で立法されたものであり、米国の金融規制全般に対する大幅な見直しを行ったものである。
　本シンポジウムでは、ドッド＝フランク法の成立から5年経過したことを契機に、同法によるさまざまな金融規制への見直しの論点のうちいくつかをピックアップし、検討を試みる。
　今般の金融危機は、金融業務のさまざまな業態をまたいでその影響が及んだことに一つの特徴がある。したがって、ドッド＝フランク法の対象もきわめて広範囲にわたり、その内容も複雑かつ膨大である。その実施にあたっては、関連当局による規則に多くが委任されているが、以上のことから必要とされる規則の数も大量であり、法が求めた期限までに制定が間に合わなかった規則も少なくなく、ドッド＝フランク法の全体像は、その成立後もなかなか明らかになってこなかった。現在に至ってもなお規則の制定と完全な法の実施は道半ばではあるが（米国の大手法律事務所の調査では、全部で390の規則制定が求められているところ、2015年7月15日現在で２４７（６３．３％）の規則が制定済みであり、６０（１５．４％）の規則が提案済みであるが、８３（２１．３％）の規則は提案にも至っていない）、それでも成立から5年が経過して、重要な論点についてはある程度規則も出そろい、その具体的な内容が明らかになってきた。同時に、実務・学界においても、賛否両論を含め、本法による金融規制見直しに対する検討の蓄積が進んできている。このタイミングで、一度本法の重要な論点を検討することは、米国の金融規制の動向を理解する上で重要な意味を持つと思われる。
　また、今般の金融危機が世界的に重大な影響をもたらしたことから、金融規制の見直しは、米国一国のみならず、欧州や日本など主要国と連携してグローバルに行われている。ドッド＝フランク法もその潮流の中に位置づけられるものといえ、そこでの規制を検討することは、世界やわが国の金融規制のあり方を検討する上でも、きわめて有益といえるだろう。

＜基調報告＞
THE SINGLE-POINT-OF-ENTRY (SPOE) STRATEGY FOR ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY (OLA) UNDER TITLE II OF DODD-FRANK (DF): AN ASSESSMENT
Charles W. Mooney, Jr. (University of Pennsylvania Law School)
I.OLA as Backup to Bankruptcy for Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs)
The OLA under DF Title II is intended to address systemic risk in the case of a failure of a SIFI. It also is intended to solve the so-called “too-big-to-fail” (or TBTF) problem―that is, the risk that the failure of one or more SIFIs could initiate a contagious panic that could bring down the financial system, necessitating government bailouts of firms (i.e., their creditors) at taxpayer expense. DF’s general strategy for a financial institution in financial distress is to direct it to a formal bankruptcy or resolution procedure.
If resolution under OLA is triggered then a large amount of financing is available from the US Treasury. However, OLA is subject to an elaborate set of triggers for its implementation. For example, it is available only if proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code would not provide a satisfactory solution or would impose systemic risks―bankruptcy proceedings being the preferred option. (Indeed, the so-called “living wills” required by DF for SIFIs are prepared on the assumption that the SIFI would be subject to a bankruptcy proceeding.) Moreover, OLA can be invoked only if the Treasury, Federal Reserve, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) agree to file a petition in federal court. The court is required to approve the petition if the firm is primarily a financial firm and is in default or close to default. The FDIC would assume control of the firm as a receiver and replace management responsible for the firm’s problems. The FDIC would impose losses on shareholders and creditors and liquidate (not reorganize) the firm. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation would share duties with the FDIC in connection with customer securities accounts of a securities broker-dealer.
II. OLA: Not a Panacea
Compared to the prevailing situation at the time of the Lehman failure, under DF the regulators now have great discretion and flexibility to deal with a failing financial institution. However, there remains considerable uncertainty as to whether regulators will intervene in such a situation and as to when and how any intervention might occur. Moreover, the potential for a bailout remains notwithstanding protests to the contrary. The priority rules under the OLA allow losses to fall on shareholders and creditors, provide that all creditors will receive at least liquidation value on their claims, and conform the proceeding in many respects to the Bankruptcy Code (such as the avoidance powers). But, in the interest of financial stability the FDIC can override the priority rules. Again, this leaves substantial uncertainty as to the distributional rules.
DF has materially reduced the likelihood of “runs” by holders of short-term debt by requiring standardized derivatives to be cleared on exchanges. Even so, many derivatives will remain outside such clearing arrangements. Moreover, DF did not deal in a meaningful way the short-term market for repurchase (repo) transactions. And, other than the living will requirements, it did little to confront the problems posed the international aspects of a SIFI’s corporate group.
III. The Chapter 14 Proposal
Proponents of a new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code―Chapter 14―seek to overcome some of the perceived defects in DF and in the OLA and in the current Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 14 would apply to financial institutions with consolidated assets in excess of $50 billion (taken from the DF scope), not only to SIFIs. For SIFIs, Chapter 14 would facilitate the SPOE strategy (discussed next). It would permit reorganization under Chapter 11 (the expected norm for SIFIs) or liquidation under Chapter 7. Chapter 14 would not override the OLA, which would remain an option for regulators even after commencement of a Chapter 14 case. Unlike the OLA, Chapter 14 would provide for the strict conformity with Bankruptcy Code priority rules. The usual judicial oversight and creditor participation under the Bankruptcy Code would also be observed in a Chapter 14 case. As discussed below, however, there are some inherent problems with addressing troubled SIFIs and implementing SPOE under the Bankruptcy Code, even if Chapter 14 were enacted.
IV. The SPOE Strategy for OLA and Bankruptcy
In recent years the FDIC has advocated an approach for implementing the OLA for a troubled financial institution―the Single-Point-of-Entry (SPOE) strategy. The approach has been widely hailed by regulators and commentators in the United States and internationally. As its moniker indicates, SPOE contemplates that only the holding company of a financial institution would become subject to a receivership but its operating subsidiaries and affiliates would remain outside of the proceeding. This approach could be appropriate only for the ubiquitous, but largely unique, corporate structure or United States (commercial) bank holding companies. The FDIC, as receiver, would transfer the subsidiaries and affiliates, with their short-term and secured debt intact, to a “bridge” entity. The holding company would be left behind in the receivership with its “loss-absorbing” long-term unsecured creditors and shareholders. The idea is that the resulting bridge entity would have an adequate capitalization, or so the argument goes. The SPOE approach, then, also is based on the existence of the United States-centric phenomenon of long-term debt at the holding company level and short-term debt at the operating subsidiary/affiliate level.
It is likely that in this SPOE scenario the insolvent holding company’s shareholders would be eliminated and any residual value of the subsidiaries would eventually be available to the long-term creditors of the holding company. Subsidiaries that are insolvent or nearly so could be recapitalized by the holding company when appropriate.
SPOE may make it more likely that regulators would invoke the OLA. It would not be necessary for the FDIC to assume control over an entire financial institution in order to liquidate it under OLA. While SPOE favors one group of creditors over another, if the FDIC provides assurances that it will follow SPOE then all concerned would know the rules of the road in advance, even if not codified, thus enhancing predictability. The simplifications offered by SPOE also may increase the chances of a more speedy resolution of the institution. Moreover, by offering the protection of short-term debt SPOE may substantially reduce the risk of runs. On the international level, SPOE may leave non-United States entities unimpaired by the United States receivership.
V. SPOE: The Shortcomings
While SPOE may make invocation of OLA more likely, it is far from a guaranty that there will be a timely response without unnecessary delay. This may be particularly so if there are one or more subsidiaries in financial distress. SPOE’s model is based on healthy subsidiaries and unsustainable long-term debt at the holding company level, but those conditions may not exist in the case of any given troubled financial institution. In addition, if there are multiple distressed financial institutions existing simultaneously, as in the 2008 financial crisis, it is possible that multiple, simultaneous SPOE receiverships would not be feasible.
There are other problematic aspects of SPOE as well. How can regulators be assured that substantial loss-absorbing long-term debt will continue to exist at the holding company level? Who will invest in that debt in an SPOE world? Must such “capital” requirements be mandated for the holding companies? How will the holders of such debt accurately estimate the level of haircuts that the FDIC might impose in a receivership?
In addition to these uncertainties, some certainties offered by SPOE may be just as troubling. If the holders of short-term debt of subsidiaries, including banks and derivatives investors, perceive that they are fully protected by the SPOE approach―as it appears to intend and promise―then incentives for short-term funding will be enhanced. One commentator (Adam Levitin), moreover, has argued that SPOE is a “no bank left behind” strategy. That is, SPOE will be a guaranty that all bank creditors are protected (“bailed out”)―depositors, payment systems, derivative counterparties, commercial paper holders, repo counterparties, and securities lending counterparties. The result will be increased moral hazard. And the FDIC is unlikely to charge a market rate of return for its implicit guaranty. DF, including its OLA provisions implemented through the SPOE approach, simply has not done away with “too big to fail.”
VI. Bankruptcy and SPOE for SIFIs
It would be possible to implement a variation of SPOE through the Bankruptcy Code, and the Chapter 14 proposal mentioned above explicitly contemplates that. But such implementation would be problematic. Given the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors for derivatives, repos, close-out netting, and the like, implementing SPOE likely would require modification of the safe harbors. (DF, for example, provides for a one-day stay.) Moreover, because a holding company’s subsidiaries, which are likely to be parties to such financial contracts, would not be subject to the Bankruptcy Code under the SPOE approach, it would be necessary to render ineffective cross-default clauses that would be triggered by the holding company bankruptcy. Other significant problems would be the need for a speedy transfer of assets by the FDIC and the need for liquidity (“DIP”) financing (which private markets might not be positioned to provide).
VII. Summary and Conclusions
The SPOE strategy for OLA may provide improvements at the margin. Clearly, the regulators have better toolkits under DF that were available in 2008. Given the complexity and size of major financial institutions, the impossibility of accurate predictions, and the uncertainties that remain for any ex ante assessments, the idea that DF has eliminated the potential for systemic risk in a financial crisis is folly. The same can be said of the idea that it has done away with TBTF and the potential for government bailouts. Moreover, the idea that government assistance is not necessary or necessarily is bad policy in a financial crisis or in the case of a SIFI also has been far overstated. The goal should be to provide a less distortive approach to government assistance. In sum, moving toward improvements at margin is a good approach and further study is worthwhile, but there are no magic bullets and there never will be.

FOUNDING PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
Patricia A. McCoy (Boston College Law School)
The 2008 financial crisis was caused, in part, by a fundamental breakdown in consumer financial protection in the United States, which in turn triggered severe systemic harm to the global economy. In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act), the U.S. Congress took strong measures to avoid a similar future crisis by establishing an effective system of consumer financial protection going forward for consumer loans and bank deposits.
The Dodd-Frank reforms were designed, in part, to address a number of market failures in the consumer finance sector that manifested themselves in 2008. Those market failures included shrouded pricing, information asymmetries, anomalies in consumer decision making, negative externalities, and breakdowns in distributive justice. In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress addressed these problems in part through enhanced disclosures, new methods of regulating price terms, standardization of financial products, examinations and enforcement, and, in some cases, by banning certain compensation methods for brokers and loan officers.
In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the creation of a new federal agency − the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the Bureau) − whose sole mission is consumer financial protection. The design of the Bureau reflects five founding principles. First, the provisions on the Bureau embrace a new philosophy of regulating according to risk instead of entity type. Second, Congress sought to avoid regulatory arbitrage by assigning virtually sole federal jurisdiction over consumer financial protection to the Bureau and by vesting jurisdiction in the Bureau over all consumer financial services providers, regardless of type. Third, Congress gave the Bureau the same independence from political interference that the federal bank safety and soundness regulators enjoy. Fourth, Congress instructed the Bureau to base its decisions on an analysis of the relevant markets and market failures.
Finally, Congress took care in designing the Bureau to help avoid a recurrence of the regulatory failure that culminated in the events of 2008. The Dodd-Frank Act does so in part by empowering both the Bureau and the states to take enforcement action against consumer financial protection violations. In addition in many cases, individual states can enact stricter consumer financial protection rules than those that the Bureau adopts, so long as any stricter state rule does not conflict with the federal rule. In sum, Congress used the U.S. federal system as a springboard to allow activist states to goad the federal government, when needed, into action.

＜報告（順不同）＞
“Regulations of the OTC derivative markest under the Dodd-Frank Act”
松尾直彦（西村あさひ法律事務所・東京大学）

「金融危機後における金融機関のコーポレート・ガバナンス」
松元暢子（学習院大学）
金融機関のコーポレート・ガバナンスの在り方が金融危機の直接の原因であると論じられることはほとんどないが、それでも、金融機関のコーポレート・ガバナンスの問題は金融危機に何らかの影響を与えた可能性があると指摘されてきた。これを背景として、ドッド・フランク法では、役員報酬等についての新たなルールが導入された。また、金融危機後には、OECDやBIS等の国際的な組織においても、コーポレート・ガバナンスに関する検討が進められた。本報告においては、こうした議論の進展を紹介するとともに、日本における金融機関のコーポレート・ガバナンスの在り方を含めた検討を行う。

「米国における信用格付機関に対する法的規制」
萬澤陽子（専修大学）
米国における信用格付機関（credit rating agencies, 以下、CRAs）の歴史は長く、19世紀半ばにまでさかのぼる。しかし、CRAsに対する規制は事実上2006年（Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006（以下、2006年法）の制定）までなされなかった。また、CRAsに対する民事訴訟は多く提起されてきたものの、責任が肯定されるものは多くなかった。
このような状況下で、2010年にドッド＝フランク法が制定され、その第9編第C章で「信用格付機関の規制の改善」が設けられ（931- 939H条）、CRAsに対する規制が強化された。本報告では、CRAsに対する規制の試みおよびCRAsに民事責任が課せられることが困難であった理由を概観し、2006年法とドッド=フランク法でCRAsがなぜおよびどのように規制されるようになったのかを、SECがドッド=フランク法に基づいて制定した規則もあわせて紹介しながら検討する。また、近年のCRAsの負う民事責任についても検討を加える。

「決済と投資家保護」
森下哲朗（上智大学）
　ドッド＝フランク法の第8編「Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision」及び、第9編「Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities」における規定内容とその後の取り組みについて検討する。

「「ボルカー・ルール」について」
小出篤（学習院大学・コーディネーター）
　ドッド＝フランク法619条は、預金保険加入預金受入れ機関（銀行）などが、自己勘定取引を行うことや、ヘッジファンドおよびプライベートエクイティファンドなどの持分を取得・保有することなどを禁ずるものであり、提案者であるポール・ボルカーFRB元議長の名をとって「ボルカー・ルール」と呼ばれる。この規制に対しては、実務に対する影響の大きさから、米国において特に活発な議論がなされているところである。本報告では、この規制の概要および米国における議論について概観し、銀行によるリスク取引への規制のあり方について示唆を得ることを試みる。